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economy and compares the abilities of market-based and bank-based financial
systems in processing the shock. The analysis of the shock propagation indi-
cates that a competitive banking system may collapse in absence of a proper
regulation. Paradoxically, it is the credibility of banks that makes bank-based
economies fragile. A necessary and sufficient condition for successfull bailout
schemes is proposed.
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1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis revived the attention towards financial systems. The devel-
opment of events required coordinated liquidity injections by the Fed, the European Central
Bank and some other central banks in 2007-08. Government interventions ranged from
bailouts of individual banks (e.g. Northern Rock in the UK) to the federal takeover of Fan-
nie Mae and Freddie Mac in the U.S. Usually, a credit crunch is seen as a consequence of an
economic slow down. However, the 2007-08 crisis arose "... in what the consensus termed
as a "Goldilocks economy"."1 Among several types of crisis triggering mechanisms (such as
external shock, political shock, self-fulfilling panics, or exhaustion of borrowing resources,
see Sachs, 1998), neither suits to explain the start of the crisis, except the external shock in
a broad sense. The current paper focuses on shock-triggered, non-recession driven banking
crises and their relation to the economic slow down. To do this, the paper studies a system
of intermediaries, which experience insufficient repayment from their borrowers who suffer
from a production shock.
A "classical" example of a shock-driven crisis may be found back in the seventies, when
the oil shock led to different consequences in market-based and bank-based financial systems.
Allen and Gale (1997) used the example of the oil shock to explain the motivation behind
their study of intertemporal risk smoothing by financial intermediation. Their welfare anal-
ysis shows that in an economy with stochastic shocks, there exists a feasible intertemporal
allocation, which is a Pareto-improvement compared to the one achieved through financial
markets. This allocation can be achieved through a financial intermediary with monopoly
power. The inefficiency of the market economy is due to the limited participation constraint
in the overlapping generations world. The monopoly power allows intermediary to create
reserves and to smooth stochastic shocks. If the individuals, who used to invest through the
banking system, obtain an access to markets, competition between markets and intermedi-
aries destroys Pareto-superiority of the intermediated economy: the resulting allocation is
not better than the one achieved in a market economy.
Still, there is a question, whether an intermediated economy performs better or worse
than a market economy after a single unrepeated shock, like the oil shock in the seventies
1 As Professor Roubini, NYU, said in his interview to the Daily Telegraph, ("US mortgage crisis goes into meltdown"
by A. Evans-Pritchard, online version from 24.02.2007 at www.telegraph.co.uk).
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or the Wall Street Crash of 1929, or the default of the Russian Government of 1998, or
the mortgage borrowers’ default in the US in 2007. If the shock is unpredictable, or if
expected losses are zero, the intermediary of Allen and Gale (1997) would not create reserves
against it. If intergenerational risk sharing through transfers from young generations to
old generations is possible, the intermediary can use such transfers to provide a better
intertemporal allocation than the market. The current paper shows that an intermediated
economy with competitive financial intermediaries may collapse after a single shock in a
finite number of periods, after which no intergenerational transfers are possible. Therefore,
the intermediation fails to provide a Pareto-improvement in the long run and an appropriate
regulation is needed to correct this failure.
The role of banking systems in processing stochastic shocks is also addressed by Gers-
bach and Wenzelburger (2008), who study the stability of the banking system in a closed
economy in presence of production shocks. In particular, they show that risk premia in a
competitive banking sector are not high enough to prevent the default of the banking sys-
tem after a series of sufficiently many negative production shocks. Whilst Allen and Gale
(1997) focus on the welfare and efficiency issues, Gersbach and Wenzelburger (2008) focus on
the prevention of macroeconomic collapse in the intermediated economy. These two papers
are the closest to the current one; in both of them repeated shocks are given by exogenous
stochastic processes.
The current paper presents a close-up of the impact of a single production shock,
in order to study the intertemporal propagation of shocks and the influence of individual
shocks on different groups of agents. To study the propagation of a single shock over many
periods, the current paper reduces the stochastic component to a single temporary negative
production shock, which is a special case of a shock distribution function. Such degenerated
shock distribution function can also be seen as a metaphor for a long enough sequence of
negative shocks in a stochastic process with zero mean. This approach is distinct from an
analysis of one single period out of a sequence of them in both models above, since it not
only highlights the impact of the shock, but also studies the subsequent effects. It is shown
that the degree of the shock is important for its propagation, and small shocks can fail to
reveal the difference between markets and banking system. With more severe shocks, market
economy concentrates the impact of the shock in one period, whereas the banking system
magnifies the impact of the shock and transfers it from period to period.
Another difference of the current paper from the two above is the multimarket structure
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of the model. This allows one to show that the shock has several transmission channels. First,
the shock can change the general equilibrium, which leads to a change in the subsequent
equilibrium path. In the current model, it is the equilibrium wage rate, which determines
the wealth endowment of the agents in the next period, and hence the equilibrium in the
next period. The market channel allows the propagation of a severe shock in both market
and intermediated economies. Second, the shock can create deficits in the banking system,
which are financed through newly acquired deposits from the next generation of agents.
Paradoxically enough, it is the credibility of banks that makes bank based economy fragile.
In absence of credibility banking system replicates financial markets.
Banking regulation is shown to be able to prevent some of the negative consequences
of the shock. In particular, allowing banks to make profits prevents the default of the
banking system.2 A particular example of such a regulation would be deposit rate ceilings
like in Gersbach and Wenzelburger (2008) and Mavrotas and Vinogradov (2007). In the
current paper a more general rule is formulated to encompass various regulatory policies and
determine the sufficient level of banks’ profits to prevent the collapse.3 With regards to the
welfare, the final judgment upon the efficiency of a regulated banking sector depends on how
one evaluates the burden of the shock in the first period compared to the distribution of the
burden over several periods.
In a broader context, the current paper contributes to the literature on macroeconomics
of banking (see e.g. Bernanke and Gertler ,1987; Bencivenga and Smith, 1991; Banerji et al.,
2004), functions of banks (Benston and Smith, 1975; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Diamond,
1984; Chemmanur and Fulghieri ,1994), and the efficiency of banking regulation (see e.g.
Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2000; Barth et al., 2004).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the general macroeconomic envi-
ronment and discusses the nature of the shock. Section 3 studies the market-based economy
that, in line with the literature, is taken as a benchmark. If the inability of the population to
access markets is the only reason for banks to exist, banking system should at least replicate
the market economy. Section 4 demonstrates that it is not the case. Section 5 discusses reg-
2 The inability of risk premia to prevent banking collapse in Gersbach and Wenzelburger (2007) is
due to the fact that competitive banks cannot set risk premia high enough to create a cushion against a
sequence of shocks. Mavrotas and Vinogradov (2007) apply the model of the current paper to the
case of non-technological shocks, and consider some particular examples of regulation.
3 There is also another strand of the literature that studies positive effects of policy measures aimed at
generating extra profits of banks. For example Hellman et al. (2000) show that deposit rate ceilings
create a franchise value and through this make banks’ investment more prudent. The focus of the
current paper is on the ability of banking systems to withstand a systemic shock, as opposed to prudential issues.
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ulatory measures, which could improve the performance of the banking system. The paper
concludes with a discussion of results.
2 Macroeconomic Environment
The description will follow as close as possible the notation of Diamond (1965), whose
model is a good departure for the analysis. Though in the current paper productive firms
are not assumed to exist infinitely long, the problem of intergenerational lending does not
arise: any debtor-creditor relationships only appear between the members of one generation.
This is an important issue, since it underlines that although banks (that will be introduced
later) are long-living institutions, they are not critical for the existence and functioning of
the economy.
2.1 Agents, Preferences and Technologies
The economy consists of overlapping generations. Each generation is distributed over
the interval [0, 1] and divided into two groups: workers and entrepreneurs with η - the share
of workers in each generation. All agents live for two periods and are endowed with one
unit of labor in the beginning of their lives. Entrepreneurs are distinct from workers in that
they have access to a production technology in the second period of their lives. The whole
young generation works, consumes and saves. The old generation consumes (if workers) or
produces and consumes (if entrepreneurs).
Generation t ≥ 1 is born in the beginning of period t, becomes old in the beginning
of period t+ 1 and lives until the end of period t+ 1. All generations are identical, except
the old generation of period t = 1, which lives only for one period and is initially endowed
with some amount of savings used for production. This generation will be neglected in the
analysis.
All agents of each generation t have identical intertemporal utility functions ut (c
0, c1)
with c0 = consumption of an agent of generation t when young, and c1 = his consumption
when old. The utility function is continuous, twice differentiable, strictly increasing, quasi-
concave and satisfies
lim
c0→0
∂ut
∂c0
∂ut
∂c1
=∞; lim
c1→0
∂ut
∂c0
∂ut
∂c1
= 0
Utility functions are identical among generations. The utility level of an agent born in
period t will hereinafter be represented through u
(
c0t , c
1
t+1
)
.
The production technology produces a consumption/capital good. The technology is
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identical among entrepreneurs and among periods and is given by f (k, l), where k = physical
capital and l = the amount of labor used for production. The full production cycle takes
exactly one period, after which new capital and new labor should be employed for the next
production cycle. This could be seen as though capital is fully depreciated after one period.4
The production function is continuous, twice differentiable, increasing, concave, satisfies
f (0, 0) = 0 and
lim
l→0
∂f
∂l
∂f
∂k
=∞; lim
k→0
∂f
∂l
∂f
∂k
= 0
2.2 Shock
The economy may suffer from a production shock. Often, economics deals with tech-
nology shocks, which are events that change a production function in macroeconomic models.
Technology shocks are permanent and mostly considered to be positive (see e.g. Galí, 2004,
for some discussion). In contrast to technology shocks, production (or productivity) shocks
can be negative. Another common type of shock in economics is a supply shock, which
can be a consequence of a technology shock (and then the supply shock is mostly posi-
tive) or not (most negative supply shocks are not technology-driven and are not necessarily
productivity-driven). In a dynamic framework, the literature distinguishes between perma-
nent and non-permanent shocks (see e.g. Hall, 1988). Temporary (non-permanent) shocks
change the production technology only for one period, whereas permanent shocks leave the
production technology changed for the subsequent periods until infinity or until the next
shock. It is also necessary to distinguish between the shock impact (instantaneous effects of
the shock) and the subsequent effects (some discussion can be found in de Jong and Penzer,
1998). The shock in the current paper is taken to be an unexpected temporary change in
output.
Assume that an entrepreneur of generation t employs kt+1 units of capital and lt+1 units
of labor. The production technology produces f (kt+1, lt+1) units of consumption/capital
good in absence of shocks. In presence of shocks, the actual output yt+1 in period t + 1 is
determined by the shock parameter qt+1:
yt+1 = qt+1f (kt+1, lt+1) (1)
The analysis here focuses on a negative shock, therefore qt+1 ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore, the
shock is assumed to be unpredictable and temporary. If the shock has its impact in period
4 The assumption of the full depreciation can be relaxed if one assumes that the production function captures total
supply of goods, including both newly produced goods and the rest of the capital stock which remains undepreciated.
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τ + 1, the distribution of the shock parameter in time can be written as
qt+1 =
{
1 if t = τ
q∗ < 1 if t = τ
(2)
The shock may equally happen in any period, therefore if we denote with T the total
number of periods the economy will go through, the probability of the shock is given by
Pr (qt+1 = q
∗) = 1
T
→
T→∞
0. This captures the unpredictability of the shock.
2.3 Decision-making and Priority of Payments
Consider a typical generation t ≥ 1. Each member of this generation may be employed
by some old entrepreneur, who offers the wage rate of wt. Since the production facilities of
these entrepreneurs are affected by shock qt, actual wage payment per unit of labor ŵt may
differ from wt. The value of ŵt is determined below.
Potential entrepreneurs of generation t solve, when young, their intertemporal utility
maximization problem, which determines their consumption c0t and savings s
E
t in period t,
as well as their consumption c1t+1 in period t+1. They face the following first-period budget
constraint:
c0t + s
E
t = ŵtl
E
t
Here lEt ∈ [0, 1] is the part of the unit labor endowment of an agent, which he wishes to be
employed. Since unemployed labor delivers no utility to the agent, but the employed labor
strictly increases his consumption, it is optimal for him to supply lEt = 1 units of labor.
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The second-period budget constraint of the entrepreneur restricts his second-period
consumption to the profit of the firm. The entrepreneur uses his savings sEt of the first period
of his life to acquire a part of capital stock kt+1 used in production. The rest
(
kt+1 − s
E
t
)
is financed through credit.6 When old, the entrepreneur employs lt+1 units of labor for
production in period t + 1. Given the price system with the price of goods normalized to
unity, the real wage rate in period t + 1 equals wt+1, and the real gross interest rate rt+1,
which applies to credit granted to entrepreneurs in period t and repaid in period t + 1, the
entrepreneur pays wt+1lt+1 for the labor, and rt+1
(
kt+1 − s
E
t
)
for the capital employed in
the production. It will be assumed that entrepreneurs have perfect foresight regarding the
future wage rate wt+1. The entrepreneur enjoys limited liability, and his expected profit is
Et+1 = max
[
qt+1f (kt+1, lt+1)− rt+1
(
kt+1 − s
E
t
)
− wt+1lt+1, 0
]
(3)
5 If ŵt = 0, the agent is indifferent with regards of how much labor l
E
t ∈ [0, 1] he supplies.
6 In general, the difference kt+1−s
E
t might be negative. In an equilibrium (see section 3), this is impossible, otherwise
the demand for credit is zero, but the supply of loanable funds is strictly positive.
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For the case his revenue is not high enough to cover the expenditures, there exists a
priority of payments: workers have the highest priority, the creditors have lower priority,
and the entrepreneur himself has the lowest priority. Therefore, period’s t + 1 total wage
expenditures of the entrepreneur et+1 are either wage payoffs at the rate wt+1 per unit of
labor, or the entire production if it does not exceed the total wage payoff due:
et+1 = min [wt+1lt+1, qt+1f (kt+1, lt+1)] (4)
The rest is used to repay the creditors, and hence the payment to creditors bt+1 amounts
to:
bt+1 = min
[
rt+1
(
kt+1 − s
E
t
)
, qt+1f (kt+1, lt+1)− et+1
]
(5)
Equation (4) determines the actual wage payment per unit of labor by each individual
entrepreneur:7
ŵt+1 = min
[
wt+1,
qt+1f (kt+1, lt+1)
lt+1
]
(6)
Summarizing and substituting for lEt = 1, one obtains the expected utility maximization
problem of entrepreneurs8 in the form
max
c0t ,c
1
t+1,s
E
t
Et
[
u
(
c0t , c
1
t+1
)]
(7)
subject to c0t = ŵt − s
E
t
c1t+1 = max
[
qt+1f (kt+1, lt+1)− rt+1
(
kt+1 − s
E
t
)
− wt+1lt+1, 0
]
Separately from the utility maximization (due to Fisher’s separation theorem), en-
trepreneurs solve the expected profit maximization problem of the firm. Since the shock is
effectively unanticipated, the problem reduces to
max
kt+1,lt+1
f (kt+1, lt+1)− rt+1
(
kt+1 − s
E
t
)
− wt+1lt+1 (8)
The properties of the production function guarantee that there are no corner solutions
to the problem. The internal solution produces the demand functions for capital kt+1 =
k (rt+1, wt+1) and for labor lt+1 = l (rt+1, wt+1). The solution of the expected utility maxi-
mization problem determines the savings function of entrepreneurs sEt = s
E (ŵt, wt+1, rt+1).
As in Diamond (1965), 0 < ∂s
E
∂ŵt
< 1 (one cannot save more than one unit from a one unit
7 If entrepreneurs are unable to meet their credit or wage obligations, they have to go through a bankruptcy
procedure which effectively means that all the property of the entrepreneurs is sold to (partially) cover their
obligations. Therefore, entrepreneurs have no incentives to cheat by claiming that they have experienced a bad shock.
8 Entrepreneurs might choose whether they invest their savings sEt into their firms or act as creditors
in the credit market. If the entrepreneurs opt for not running firms, their optimization problem is
identical to that of the workers. However, this case is irrelevant for the analysis. The equilibrium
outcome would guarantee that the credit interest rate is below the expected profitability of the firms.
Otherwise, all entrepreneurs avoid running firms and the demand for credit is zero whilst the credit supply is positive.
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increase in endowment); additionally, it can be shown that ∂s
E
∂wt+1
< 0 and ∂s
E
∂rt+1
> 0.
Workers of generation t solve, when young, the intertemporal utility maximization
problem similar to that of entrepreneurs. This determines their consumption c0t and savings
sWt in period t, as well as the consumption c
1
t+1 in period t+ 1.
The budget constraint of a typical worker of generation t for the first period of his life
is
c0t + s
W
t = ŵtl
W
t
Similarly to entrepreneurs, lWt = 1 in the worker’s individual optimum.
Workers lend their savings sWt to young entrepreneurs at rate rt+1. If after the realiza-
tion of shock qt+1 in period t+1 the actual credit payoff to an individual worker is less than
rt+1s
W
t , the worker (creditor) experiences a deficit and his second period budget constraint
should be adjusted for this underpayment. The actual credit payoff from each individual
entrepreneur bt+1 is given by (5), resulting in an aggregate payoff of (1− η) bt+1 and hence
an average creditor obtains 1−η
η
bt+1.
Definition 2.1 Deficit of an individual creditor in period t+ 1 is
dWt+1 =
1− η
η
bt+1 − rt+1s
W
t (9)
The second-period budget constraint of the worker restricts the second-period con-
sumption to be equal to the return on his savings adjusted with a possible deficit:
c1t+1 = rt+1s
W
t + d
W
t+1
Since dWt+1 is conditioned on qt+1, consumption in the second period is uncertain. Sub-
stituting for lWt = 1 and summarizing, one can write the expected utility maximization
problem of workers of this generation as follows:9
max
c0t ,c
1
t+1,s
W
t
Et
[
u
(
c0t , c
1
t+1
)]
(10)
subject to c0t = ŵt − s
W
t
c1t+1 = rt+1s
W
t + d
W
t+1
This problem determines the savings function of workers sWt = s
W (ŵt, rt+1). As in the
entrepreneurs’ case above, 0 < ∂s
W
∂ŵt
< 1 (an increase in income leads to an increase in
9 Formally, there are two stochastic components in the budget constraints: first, it is ŵt, which is determined by the
realization of the shock in period t, and second, it is dWt+1, determined by the realization of the shock in period t+1. The
model describes the world with (almost) safe production technology and no alternative assets. It could be
extended for the case with a safe asset. Particularly, this would imply strictly positive real interest rates in equilibrium.
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savings but each unit of income generates less than one unit of savings) and ∂s
W
∂rt+1
> 0
(savings increase in the interest rate). Contrast to entrepreneurs, workers’ savings do not
depend on the future wage rate.
2.4 Degrees of Shock
In any period t+1, one can determine two critical values of the shock parameter. First,
qt+1 such that for any qt+1 ≥ qt+1 total production of an individual entrepreneur covers all
his production expenses:
qt+1 =
rt+1
(
kt+1 − s
E
t
)
+ wt+1lt+1
f (kt+1, lt+1)
Second, q
t+1
such that for any qt+1 > qt+1 total production covers at least wage ex-
penses:
q
t+1
=
wt+1lt+1
f (kt+1, lt+1)
Further, it will be assumed that the shock takes place after the economy settles in
stationary equilibrium. In stationary equilibrium, the values of qt+1 and qt+1 are constant
in time, and will be hereinafter denoted with q and q respectively. Given the priority of
payments, and the two critical values above, one can distinguish between four degrees of
shock:
1. Small shock: q∗ ∈ [q, 1] . Both employees and creditors are repaid in full.
2. Moderate shock: q∗ ∈
[
q, q
)
. Entrepreneurs are bankrupts, employees are repaid in full,
and creditors obtain the residual. Payoff to workers from each entrepreneur is et+1 =
wt+1lt+1, debt repayment is bt+1 = q
∗f (kt+1, lt+1)− wt+1lt+1.
3. Severe shock: q∗ ∈
(
0, q
)
. Entrepreneurs are bankrupt, the value of production does not
suffice to repay workers in full. Debt repayments are zero, bt+1 = 0, the wage payment is
et+1 = q
∗f (kt+1, lt+1)
4. Extreme shock q∗ = 0 corresponds to a complete destruction of production facilities.
Entrepreneurs have zero revenue, wage payment and credit repayment is zero.
Note that the degrees of the shock are relative to economic conditions, which determine
q and q. In a capital intensive economy both q and q should be expected to be lower than in a
labor intensive one, which makes capital intensive economies more prone toward production
shocks. Appendix A provides further discussion of the degrees of the shock and relates them
to the level of economic development.
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3 Market Economy
This section describes the equilibrium before and after the production shock in an econ-
omy, in which the exchange of resources takes place through markets, and no intermediation
is needed. We refer to this case as a market economy.
3.1 Market equilibrium
The following summarizes the life cycle of a typical generation t ≥ 1. All agents of this
generation exchange their unit labor endowment for ŵt units of goods. Out of this amount,
workers and entrepreneurs create their savings sWt and s
E
t respectively. In the end of period
t, entrepreneurs of generation t acquire an additional capital stock It = kt+1−s
E
t . Investment
in the production technology takes place in the end of period t. There exists a credit market,
in which workers can trade their savings against promissory notes of entrepreneurs. Credit
market clears in period t with interest rate rt+1.
There also exists a labor market in each period t. Entrepreneurs of generation t employ
members of generation t + 1 for production in period t + 1 at the wage rate wt+1. Since
the supply of labor is fixed at unity, the equilibrium wage rate only depends on the labor
demand. Therefore, the labor market of period t+ 1 clears at the wage rate wt+1, which is
known already in period t.
Period t + 1 starts and the shock parameter qt+1 is realized. Each old entrepreneur’s
wage expenditures are et+1, and each member of generation t + 1 obtains ŵt+1 per unit of
labor. Capital payoffs from entrepreneurs of generation t to workers of the same generation
take place within period t+1 and amount to bt+1 from each individual entrepreneur. Workers
realize deficit of dWt+1 =
1−η
η
bt+1 − rt+1s
W
t .
The analysis focuses on temporary equilibria in each period t conditioned on the real-
ization of the shock parameter qt (Markov equilibria). Each period’s t temporary equilibrium
is parametrized on ŵt inherited from the previous period according to (6). In the very first
period, ŵt is given by the initial condition w1.
Definition 3.1 A (Markov) equilibrium in the shock-exposed market economy in period
t ≥ 1 under the parameter ŵt is an array of the price vector
{
r∗t+1, w
∗
t+1
}
and of the allocation
vector
{
k∗t+1, l
∗
t+1, s
E∗
t , s
W∗
t
}
, which for a given qt provides that the credit and labor markets
clear:
1. (1− η)
(
kt+1 − s
E
t
)
= ηsWt
2. (1− η) lt+1 = 1
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The left-hand side in the first equilibrium condition represents the aggregate demand
of entrepreneurs for credit resources and the right-hand side is the aggregate supply of credit
resources by workers. In the second equilibrium condition the left-hand side represents
the aggregate demand of entrepreneurs for labor, whereas the supply of labor is fixed at 1.
Knowing the equilibrium of period t, and the realization of the shock qt+1, one can determine
realized deficit in period t+ 1: dWt+1 =
1−η
η
bt+1 − rt+1s
W
t .
Note that the equilibrium of period t is not conditioned on the level of deficits dWt . This
is the distinctive property of the market economy (compared to the intermediated economy
that will be discussed later in the paper). The level of deficits dWt is only relevant for the
level of consumption of old workers in period t, but not for the future equilibria.10
Proposition 3.1 The equilibrium exists and is unique for any period t ≥ 1 if ŵt > 0.
The proof of the proposition is based on Arrow and Debreu (1954), see Appendix C.
Note that an extreme shock (qt = 0) implies ŵt = 0 and hence violates the existence of the
equilibrium.
3.2 Graphic representation
The equilibrium may be represented in terms of two lines in the (wt+1, rt+1)-plane
depicting equilibria in the credit market (CM-line) and in the labour market (LM-line)
correspondingly (see Fig. 1. Formally, using the notation that follows (8) and (10), the
CM-line is the locus of (wt+1, rt+1) to solve
(1− η)
(
k (rt+1, wt+1)− s
E (ŵt, wt+1, rt+1)
)
= ηsWt (ŵt, rt+1) (CM)
The LM-line is the locus of (wt+1, rt+1) to solve
(1− η) l (rt+1, wt+1) = 1 (LM)
10 It is easy to check that in each period the aggregate consumption by both old and young generations together with
aggregate savings by the young generation sum up to the aggregate output, see Appendix B.
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Figure 1. Market Equilibrium
Since the slope of the CM-line can be either negative or positive (but never smaller
than the slope of the LM-line, see Lemma 6.2 in Appendix C), both cases are presented in
the diagram. Since both cases lead to identical results, only one of them is shown in Fig. 2
which is a comparative statics representation of a change in the equilibrium after the shock.
If the shock leads to a contraction of resources available in the credit market, the CM-line
shifts upwards (for any given wage level equilibrium in the credit market will be achieved
at a higher interest rate). A more detailed analysis of the effects of the shock is provided
below.
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Figure 2. Changes in the market equilibrium due to a reduced availability of credit resources
after the shock
3.3 Evolution after a shock
First, consider the market economy without shocks with an initial condition w1 > 0.
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Assume there exists such a path of equilibrium price systems {wt+1, rt+1}
∞
t=0 that wt+1 = wt
at least for all t ≥ τ . In the absence of shocks (qt+1 = 1) we obtain ŵt+1 = wt+1. If the wage
level stays unchanged, so does the actual wage payment ŵt+1, and the interest rate level
rt+1. The existence of a single stable steady state is an assumption in Diamond (1965). The
objective of the current paper is to study the difference between the ways the market and
the intermediated economies cope with production shocks. It is easier done, if the market
economy possesses a single stable steady state in absence of shocks. This assumption may
be relaxed, in which case however it would not be obvious, what drives the instability of
the steady state in the intermediated economy below. The instability might in that case be
either a specific property of the intermediated economy or the heritage from the basic market
economy model. To exclude the latter, it is convenient to deal with a market economy which
possesses a single stable stationary equilibrium.
Consider now the market economy in its stationary equilibrium in some period τ and
assume it is hit by the shock in period τ + 1: qτ+1 = q
∗ < 1.
If the shock is small, q∗ ∈ [q, 1], entrepreneurs are able to fully pay both wages and
debts in period τ + 1. Next period starts with the same equilibrium as before the shock.
The only population that suffers from the shock, are entrepreneurs of generation τ .
If the shock is moderate, q∗ ∈
[
q, q
)
, entrepreneurs are able to pay wages in full, but
are unable to meet in full their debt obligations. Old workers experience in this case deficits
dWτ+1 =
1− η
η
(q∗f (kτ+1, lτ+1)− wτ+1lτ+1)− rτ+1s
W
τ < 0
The fall in production causes deficits to change (dW falls from dWτ = 0 to some d
W
τ+1 < 0).
Still, this does not change anything in the equilibrium path, since the old workers do not
participate in the clearing of the new credit market. The only generation, which suffers from
the shock, is the old generation. Young agents obtain the endowment of ŵτ+1 = wτ+1 = wτ ,
which allows them to clear credit and labor markets with the same prices and allocations as
in the stationary equilibrium before.
The case of a severe shock, q∗ ∈
(
0, q
)
, differs from the above in that the initial
change in deficits is larger (since creditors receive nothing from entrepreneurs), and the
young generation experiences wage underpayment. Generation τ +1 obtains the endowment
of ŵτ+1 < wτ+1 = wτ . As a result, savings of the young generation, s
W
τ+1, are smaller than
those of the previous generation sWτ . This causes CM-line to shift upwards (for any new wage
level, credit market clears with a higher interest rate, see Fig. 2). The resulting equilibrium
wage level w∗τ+2 is lower than w
∗
τ+1 = w
∗
τ . Along with that, the equilibrium interest rate
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increases from r∗τ+1 to r
∗
τ+2.
Since the clearing of the credit market does not involve old workers, the deficit is not
transferred to the next period:
dWτ+n+1 =
1− η
η
rτ+n+1
(
kτ+n+1 − s
E
τ+n
)
− rτ+n+1s
W
τ+n = 0 (11)
which is valid for any n ∈ N. Since there are no new shocks, the economy recovers to the
stationary steady state, as soon as q∗ > 0.11
This can be summarized in the following result.
Proposition 3.2 Assume there exists a single stable stationary equilibrium in absence of
shocks. The evolution of the market economy in presence of a shock depends on the degree
of the latter:
1. If qτ+1 ≥ q, then the market economy does not deviate from the steady state equilibrium
path.
2. If 0 < qτ+1 < q, then the market economy recovers to the steady state.
Proposition 3.2 shows that the concept of stability in an economy without shocks may
be extended to the case of the economy exposed to shocks. Note that small and moderate
shocks only influence the consumption of the generation that is old in the shock period. If the
shock is severe, this generation suffers from zero consumption, whereas the young generation
of that period experiences wage payoffs below those in the steady state.
It is important that the old generation cannot smooth the burden of the shock through
borrowings from the young generation: the old generation physically cannot pay back in the
next period, since it dies in the end of the current period. This incomplete participation
problem could be solved with help of a long-lived financial intermediary.
4 Intermediated Economy
Financial intermediation is present in the economy through banks, which collect savings
from workers in form of deposits, and offer credit to entrepreneurs. The capital of financial
intermediaries is assumed to be zero. It might be seen, e.g., as though financial intermediaries
possess negligibly small capital and belong to old workers in each period t. The ownership is
then transferred from one generation to another through bequests and no market for banks’
11 Otherwise, the economy collapses in the shock period. The existence of the equilibrium is violated:
qτ+1 = 0 implies ŵτ+1 = 0, and hence s
E
τ+1 = s
W
τ+1 = 0, though the credit demand is strictly positive.
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stocks is needed. The ownership could change budget constraints in (10) through dividend
payments, but due to the exogeneity of dividends for workers, the consumption-savings
decision of the latter is unchanged. The banking system is assumed to be homogeneous and
is further considered as a whole.
The sequence of events is the same as in the market economy, except for the credit
market, which is now split into two parts: the deposit market and the credit market per se.
The collection of deposits starts in period t, when workers of generation t create their
savings sWt . In the end of period t, entrepreneurs apply for credit to start their businesses.
Payoffs of entrepreneurs to banks take place within period t+1. The value of deposits made
with the banks is equal to the value of aggregate savings of workers ηsWt . In period t + 1
banks have to pay the total of ηrDt+1s
W
t back to depositors.
It is assumed that no credit rationing takes place, and therefore no credit application
is rejected. The amount of credit granted totals (1− η)
(
kt+1 − s
E
t
)
. Within period t+ 1 all
entrepreneurs pay back to banks the total of Bt+1 = (1− η) bt+1, where bt+1 is defined as
above with the only exception that rt+1 should be replaced with the credit rate r
C
t+1.
For the following analysis we can use the savings functions and the demand for produc-
tion factors derived above for the market economy. The only changes concern the distinction
between the credit and deposit markets. The savings function of entrepreneurs and their
demand for production factors in period t depend now on the credit interest rate rCt+1 instead
of rt+1. The savings function of workers depends on the deposit interest rate r
D
t+1 instead of
rt+1.
If in period t+1 the total payoff of entrepreneurs to banks does not cover total obliga-
tions of banks before their depositors, banks experience a deficit. Numerically it equals the
aggregate deficit of all workers in the market economy above.
Definition 4.1 Deficit in the banking system in period t+ 1 is
dt+1 = (1− η) bt+1 − ηr
D
t+1s
W
t (12)
Banks are credible institutions and can use newly accumulated deposits to meet current
withdrawals.12 As a result, the aggregated balance sheet of banks is:
(1− η)
(
kt+1 − s
E
t
)
= ηsWt + dt (13)
Since banks operate in a competitive environment, neither deposit rates rDt+1 nor credit
12 Wagner (1857) based his "theory of banking sediment" (Bodensatztheorie) upon a similar idea.
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rates rCt+1 differ among banks, therefore interest rates are taken as uniform in the market.
Proposition 4.1 Competition in the banking system implies rDt+1 = r
C
t+1 = rt+1
The proof of the proposition follows from the fact that the expected profit of banks is
equal to zero under competition in the banking system.
Now we can define a competitive equilibrium in the intermediated economy exposed to
shocks:
Definition 4.2 A (Markov) equilibrium in the shock-exposed intermediated economy in pe-
riod t ≥ 1 under parameters {ŵt, dt} is an array of the price vector
{
rC∗t+1, r
D∗
t+1, w
∗
t+1
}
and of
the allocation vector
{
k∗t+1, l
∗
t+1, s
E∗
t , s
W∗
t
}
, which provides that
1. (1− η)
(
kt+1 − s
E
t
)
= ηsWt + dt
2. (1− η) lt+1 = 1
3. rCt+1 = r
D
t+1 = rt+1
The last condition is the competitive outcome for credit and deposit interest rates. The
link between the deposit and the credit market is given by the balance sheet equation of the
banks (condition 1 in definition 4.2).
As soon as new period t + 1 starts, the shock realization qt+1 determines parameters
{ŵt+1, dt+1} of the new equilibrium:
1. dt+1 = (1− η) bt+1 − ηrt+1s
W
t
with bt+1 = min
[
rt+1
(
kt+1 − s
E
t
)
, qt+1f (kt+1, lt+1)− et+1
]
and et+1 = min [wt+1lt+1, qt+1f (kt+1, lt+1)]
2. ŵt+1 = min
[
wt+1,
qt+1f(kt+1,lt+1)
lt+1
]
Note that changes in the deficit level influence only the CM-line, and do not influence
the LM-line, although the resulting temporary equilibrium would differ for different values
of dt. An increase in the absolute value of deficits increases the equilibrium interest rate as
defined by the credit market for any wage level wt+1 so that the CM-line shifts upwards in
(wt+1, rt+1)-plane (straightforward from the equilibrium condition for the credit market):
∂rCMt+1
∂dt
< 0 (14)
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The sign "<" in inequality (14) is due to the fact that dt ≤ 0, and an increase in its
absolute value corresponds to a decrease in dt.
Lemma 4.1 The equilibrium interest rate and the equilibrium wage rate depend on the
deficit in the banking sector: the equilibrium interest rate increases and the equilibrium wage
level decreases with the absolute value of the deficit:
∂r∗t+1
∂dt
< 0;
∂w∗t+1
∂dt
> 0 (15)
The intuition behind this lemma is obvious. According to (14) and due to the indepen-
dence of the labor market equilibrium of the deficit in the banking system, the equilibrium
interest rate and the wage level are determined by the movement of the equilibrium point
along the LM-line. Graphically, changes in the equilibrium in response to an increase in the
absolute value of the deficit are the same as shown in Figure 2.
Proposition 4.2 If dt = 1 for any t ≥ 1, then the intermediated economy replicates the
market economy.
This result ensures that if with no shocks the market economy converges to the steady
state, so does the intermediated economy. Zero deficits in the banking system lead to the
identity in the balance sheets of the market economy and of the intermediated one. It is
important that there is no risk in any form. This allows one to neglect the crucial differ-
ence between direct debt contracts and indirect lending through deposit contracts: the debt
contract presumes limited liability of the issuer and the deposit contract presumes unlim-
ited liability of the bank under the assumption that the bank may finance deficits through
borrowing from future generations.
Now assume again that in period τ the economy is in the steady state equilibrium, and
the shock parameter takes the value of q∗ < 1 in period τ + 1.
Proposition 4.3 The evolution of the intermediated economy depends on the degree of the
shock:
1. If q∗ ∈ [q, 1], then the economy converges to the steady state with d = 0.
2. If q∗ ∈
[
q, q
)
, then under positive real interest rates the economy collapses in a finite
number of periods, otherwise it converges to the steady state with d = 0 (if real interest
rates are negative) or transfers deficits to future periods (if real interest rates are zero).
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3. If q∗ ∈
(
0, q
)
, the banking system is bankrupt in the period of the shock.
The intuition behind proposition 4.3 is as follows. If q∗ ≥ q then old entrepreneurs
repay in full and no deficits in the banking system appear. Proposition 4.2 guarantees that
the intermediated economy replicates the market one, which converges to the steady state.
If q∗ < q, then necessarily dτ+1 < 0 since entrepreneurs default on their debts. Banks may
exercise intertemporal smoothing and repay old creditors in full, covering the deficit through
borrowing from the next generation of depositors. This augments deficits with factor rτ+2,
since this is the interest rate to be paid on newly accumulated deposits. Due to competition,
the net profit of banks is zero and cannot reduce the deficit. As a result, the deficit follows
the development path:
dt+1 = r
∗
t+1dt, t > τ (16)
The resulting phase line dt+1 (dt) is shown in the phase plane in Fig. 3. Positive real interest
rate13 implies r∗t+1 > 1, which explains the slope of the phase line, and (15) implies that
interest rate increases with higher absolute value of deficits, which explains the curvature
of the phase line. Since the absolute value of deficits grows from period to period at an
increasing rate, any finite level of deficits will be achieved in a finite number of periods. A
soon as in n periods after the shock the level of deficits falls to dτ+n ≤ dτ+n = −ηs
W
τ+n.
In other words, in a finite number of periods, the deficit in the banking system cannot be
covered anymore with newly accumulated deposits. If q∗ < q, this happens immediately after
the shock, since entrepreneurs fully default on their debts, and underpay workers compared
to the steady state. As a result, newly accumulated deposits cannot cover the deficit.
13 A negative real interest rate would have an effect of a subsidy provided by future generations, and
would shrink the deficits. If workers might choose between depositing with the bank and investing
in a durable good, negative real interest rate would be impossible. This would require changes in
the utility maximization problems in the beginning of the paper.
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Figure 3. Evolution of the deficit in the banking system
Note that the collapse of the intermediated economy is only possible if banks are
credible long lived institutions and can borrow from next generations to cover the deficit. If
banks are not credible, the first young after-shock generation refuses to deposit with banks
experiencing deficits. This leads to insolvency and bankruptcy of banks, and as a result,
the old generation is repaid exactly in the same amount as discussed above for the market
economy. The young generation can then create new banks to enable the flow of funds from
young workers to young entrepreneurs. Credibility of banks is therefore harmful for the
economy, since a credible banking system amplifies the impact of a single production shock
until the economy collapses.14
An important issue here is that the population cannot observe the shock or at least
are unaware about the degree of the shock (proposition 4.3 guarantees that small shocks
are harmless for the intermediated economy, thus agents don’t need to worry if the shock
is small). As soon as wages and deposits are repaid in full no generation can observe (or
have incentives to investigate) how harmful is the shock. Moreover, even if the information
about deficits in the banking system is available, guarantees from a regulatory authority can
be enough to make people believe that the banking system can recover. The next section
determines what properties should the regulatory policy have in order to enable the recovery
of the banking system.
14 Even though a collapse of the banking system in the real world is difficult to imagine, the model
predicts a tightening of credit conditions after a shock in the intermediated economy.
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5 Regulation
The last result underlines the role of the competition in the banking sector, which
can now collapse contrast to the non-competitive banking system of Allen and Gale (1997).
Indeed, if the competition is not intense, banks are able to exploit positive profit margin,
which they could use to cover the deficit. The [somewhat counterintuitive] case of negative
real interest rates above allows competitive banks to recover without any regulation because
deficit is reduced in this case from period to period. Similarly, a proper regulation should
create facilities for deficit reduction.
Assume a regulatory measure is introduced which distorts the competitive outcome by
creating an interest rate margin δregt+1 = r
C
t+1 − r
D
t+1 in each period t + 1 if dt < 0. Such a
regulatory measure might be a deposit rate ceiling, or a takeover of problematic banks by a
centralized agency, or a restrictive liquidity injection. The following proposition formulates
a necessary and sufficient condition for the banking system to recover.
Proposition 5.1 The banking system recovers after the shock and the economy converges
to the steady state with d = 0 if and only if in any after-shock period dt < 0 implies δ
reg
t+1 (dt) >
δcritt+1 (dt), where
δcritt+1 (dt) =
(
rCt+1 − 1
)
(−dt)
ηsWt
> 0.
The proof is given in Appendix C. In an economy where the government cares about
the credibility of the banking system the anti-crisis intervention should create the profit
margin for banks in accordance with the Proposition 5.1. If the government chooses to
bankrupt banks, the Proposition still holds since only banks with dt = 0 are kept open.
The Proposition underlines that it is in general not enough to ensure a positive interest rate
margin for banks to recover. The critical margin δcritt+1 (dt) would just compensate for the
growth of the deficit due to interest accrued on it during the period. If profit opportunities
of banks are below this level, their balance sheets deteriorate. If the interest rate margin is
higher than δcritt+1 (dt), banks are able to reduce deficits. It follows that the intervention of
the regulator should be prompt, otherwise the deterioration of banks’ balance sheets would
require higher interest rate margins to reduce the deficit.
Allen and Gale (1997) assume an intermediary to possess monopoly power, which
allows it to accumulate reserves. Gersbach and Wenzelburger (2008) consider a competitive
case and show that even if intermediaries enjoy positive interest rate margin, explained by
a risk premium, banking system still may collapse, since the competition will shrink the
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margin. The model above shows that the development path of the intermediated economy
differs from that of the market economy only if banks enjoy credibility and if the production
shock is strong enough to create the deficit. Mavrotas and Vinogradov (2007) use this last
fact to apply the model to the case of a repayment shock and analyze regulatory measures,
which may improve the performance of the intermediated economy. In particular, at the
examples of liquidity provision, interest rate regulation and capital requirements they show
that a regulatory measure is only effective if it distorts the competitive outcome in the
banking industry, namely if it provides for strictly positive expected profit opportunities for
banks. This explains, why the intermediary in Allen and Gale (1997) needs market power to
perform better than markets, and why risk premia in Gersbach and Wenzelburger (2008) do
not solve the problem of banking collapse: competitive banks are unable to use the interest
rate margin to create reserves or to cover the deficit.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
A market-based financial system provides for a quick recovery of the economy after
a non-permanent negative production shock. The vulnerability of the economy to shocks
depends on the level of economic development. Depending on the degree of the shock, an
unregulated bank-based financial system can either replicate the market economy or collapse
within a finite number of periods. This difference arises through the fact that the banking
system transfers the shock into the future through its balance-sheet channel, in addition to
the market channel. The balance-sheet channel allows deficit banks to borrow from future
generations of depositors in order to repay the current depositors in full. Under competition,
banks suffer from the zero profit margin and are unable to reduce the deficit. If banks are
not credible, they are liquidated immediately after they start experiencing deficits. Absence
of credibility can thus be optimal for the economy, as it prevents accumulation of deficits
over periods. A regulatory measure should create conditions for a positive expected bank
profit margin. In an economy with a properly regulated banking system the recovery is in
general slower than in the market economy.
There is no explicit answer to the question whether banks do better than markets or
vice versa. The paper stresses that not only they differ in their intertemporal risk smoothing
abilities but also these smoothing abilities crucially depend on the degree of shocks and
the regulatory environment. Should intertemporal smoothing be ever implemented if it
is associated with future output losses? It should be noted that since the model above
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focused on production shocks, both economies suffer from output losses. However the model
demonstrates that losses in disposable income of after-shock generations very much differ
in the two economies. This creates a trade-off between the two systems. For some social
welfare functions the system that provides for a short period of high losses in disposable
income would be strictly preferred to the system that provides for a longer sequence of
periods with of lower losses in each of them. For other social welfare functions the result
may be opposite, depending on the weight the current generation has in the intertemporal
social welfare function. A recession can be more harmful for the population of less developed
economies, because lower income and lower savings make people less protected. At the same
time, shocks that are small (insignificant) for highly capitalized economies can be severe for
economies with low capitalization (see Appendix A). These two observations suggest that
intertemporal risk smoothing through a properly regulated banking system may be highly
desirable for less developed economies even though it is associated with longer output losses.
Although banks in the current paper use new deposits to repay old depositors (which
is natural for banks as pointed out yet by Wagner, 1857), they differ from a classical Ponzi
scheme in several ways. First, banks do credit firms, whereas a Ponzi enterprise does not
need to engage in this type of activity. If banks fail to channel funds from depositors to firms,
they lack a reason to exist in the framework of this paper, and thus the issue of credibility
and debt rollover would not matter. Second, for a Ponzi enterprise it is crucial that it has
no competitors, whereas it is the competition that drives the result in the current paper.
With no competition banks would be able to cover deficits from profits, and therefore no
Ponzi-bubble would appear. Third, a classical Ponzi-enterprise uses its monopolistic power
to set the interest rate on the instrument it issues and the rate of growth of the outstanding
stock of this instrument in such a way that the difference between the two creates risk-free
profit opportunities at least for a finite number of periods (see e.g. Bhattacharya, 2003).
In contrast, in the current paper banks inherit deficits (if any) from previous periods and
thus in any given period deficits are exogenous and cannot be a choice variable. In any
period each bank only can obtain the amount of deposits that is fixed by the deposit market
interest rate. It is not optimal for banks to cheat and increase the absolute level of deficits
because this decreases investment and thus the profit of the current period. Therefore, the
optimal level of deficits is zero, as shown for the steady state. Banks are rather trapped
in a market equilibrium with no profit opportunities and the outstanding stock of issued
financial instruments (deposit contracts) determined by the market. Some researchers see
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any long enough debt rollover as a Ponzi-game (see e.g. O’Connell and Zeldes, 1988) and in
this sense the above model demonstrates how such a "Ponzi-scheme" arises in a competitive
equilibrium and disappears as soon as banks’ profit opportunities are above competitive
level. 15
This paper did not pretend to explain the recent financial crisis. It rather focused on
the question why prompt reaction of the authorities to shock-driven crises can be important
if not crucial, and what features of the regulatory intervention are sufficient to reverse the
crisis development. Still the example of the mortgage crisis in a predominantly market-based
economy stresses the role of the coexistence of several credit channels. In an economy with
multiple credit channels, the risk of the whole economy being exposed to a systemic shock is
lower than in the model above. Indeed, if firms are financed through both markets and banks
simultaneously, the shock is partly absorbed in financial market, where old creditors suffer
from the default of borrowers. However, in a model, in which banks and financial market
coexist, the assumption of no market access fails, and hence there should be a different
reason for banks to exist.
Another aspect of multiple credit channels is segmented intermediation. If there are
several types of intermediaries, and each of them serves a distinct sector of economy, a shock
in one sector could be transferred to other sectors through non-financial markets like labor
market in the model above. This issue of non-financial contagion seems to be an appealing
direction for future research.
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Appendix A. Degrees of Shock
The shock in the model is determined by the shock parameter q∗ ∈ [0; 1], and is
measured by the output after the shock as a percentage of the output in steady state. This
does not, however, mean that the shock of q∗, which is moderate or severe in one economy,
would be necessarily moderate or severe in another economy. To discuss this issue, assume
that the shock q∗ occurs in the steady state. The severity of the shock depends on the steady
state price system, namely on the wage and interest rate level.
The lower limit of the small shock is then
q =
r
(
k − sE
)
+ wl
f
(
k, l
) (A-1)
and the lower limit of the moderate shock is
q =
wl
f
(
k, l
) (A-2)
with the "barred" variables referring to the steady state.
As it can be seen, an economy with a higher share of capital in production has nec-
essarily a smaller q, and hence is less vulnerable with respect to a shock: the probability
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that a shock of q∗ is moderate, but not severe, is in highly capitalized economies higher than
in less capitalized economies. Indeed, the ratio
f(k,l)
l
is the average productivity of labor
APL
(
k, l
)
, which increases as the capitalization of production increases. In the stationary
point, profit-maximizing firms set the wage level equal to the marginal product of labor
w =MPL
(
k, l
)
. Hence, equation (A-2) may be written in a form
q =
MPL
(
k, l
)
APL
(
k, l
)
On the one hand, the higher the average productivity of labor, the smaller the interval(
0, q
)
, which determines the area of severe shocks. On the other hand, higher capitalization
leads to a higher marginal product of labor, so that the general effect may be ambiguous
and depends on the substitutability between labor and capital.16
Equation (A-1) may be reformulated as
q =
r
(
k − sE
)
f
(
k, l
) + q
so that the term
r(k−sE)
f(k,l)
indicates the length of the interval
[
q, q
)
of the moderate shock. Note
that sE is the internal finance provided by entrepreneurs themselves, and k− sE is external
borrowing. The higher the share of internal capital, the higher the probability of the shock
being small. Vice versa, the higher the share of the external capital, the more vulnerable
is the economy to the production shock. The above reasoning also applies to the average
productivity of the borrowed capital APKB =
f(k,l)
k−sE
and to the marginal productivity of
capital MPK = r:
q − q =
MPK
(
k, l
)
APKB
(
k, l
)
One may expect that in economies with high capitalization and low costs of capital (due
to decreasing marginal productivity, high capitalization implies lowMPK and therefore low
equilibrium borrowing costs), the difference q − q shrinks.
If one assumes that both q and q − q are decreasing functions of k, the following
schematic representation is possible (see Fig. 4).17 In the figure, it is shown that a shock
q∗ may be seen as a moderate shock for a smaller economy, whereas it is a small shock
for a large (highly capitalized) economy. Moreover, it is also possible that a shock q∗∗,
16 For a Cobb-Douglas production function f = kαlβ (α + β ≤ 1) one obtains APL = fl = k
αlβ−1
andMPL = βkαlβ−1, so that q = β < 1. If capital and labor are perfect substitutes (f = αk+βl),MPL = β, and q =
1
αk/l+β
, which decreases as capitalization increases.
17 The purpose of the diagram is only to illustrate the possibility of different treatment of the same
shock by different economies. A detailed analysis of the shock-response functions is not the focus of this paper.
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Figure 4. Degrees of shock for economies with different capitalization.
which is small for a highly developed economy, is severe for a less developed economy.18 For
example, a loss of 10% GDP (the shock parameter q∗ = 0.9) can represent a small shock for
a developed economy, but be a moderate (or even severe) shock for an underdeveloped labor-
intense economy with low average productivity of labor. This discussion suggests that the
results of the current paper may be of different significance for developed and underdeveloped
economies.
Countries with more labor-intensive production seem to be more vulnerable to stronger
shocks, whereas developed countries seem to be less vulnerable to the degrees of the shock,
which may demonstrate the difference between the market-based and bank-based financial
systems. This qualitative remark may be another fact in favor of establishing bank-oriented
financial systems in emerging economies, due to their smaller capitalization and poorer tech-
nological development. On the contrary, in developed economies the probability of moderate
shocks is lower, and the advantages of the banking system in intertemporal smoothing of
exogenous negative shocks may be less noticeable.
18 Here, the development is understood in sense of the marginal product - average product ratios introduced above. I
do not focus on this issue further, since the degree of the development is not the principal issue in the
analysis here. Still, it is important to note that the relevance of the analysis may be different for different economies.
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Appendix B. Aggregate constraint
The equilibrium in the model is defined for the credit and labor markets. Imlicitly
there is also a market for goods in this economy. The market for goods is in equilibrium
by construction: the economy is described in real terms, so that the budget constraints
guarantee equilibrium in the market for goods. To calculate the aggregate constraints we
take into account that the mass of workers is η and the mass of entrepreneurs is 1− η. To
make the exposition brief we use the fact that workers supply exactly one unit of labor. In
each period t > 1 (the very first period in overlapping generation models differs from the rest
because special assumptions need to be done about the old generation and its endowment)
the aggregate output in the economy is Yt = (1− η) qtft and is distributed for consumption
of the old generation and consumption and savings of the young generation of this period.
Consumption of the old workers cOWt equals their earnings from their savings deposited or
invested in the previous period (adjusted for a possible deficit):
cOWt = η
(
rts
W
t−1 + d
W
t
)
Consumption of the young generation (cYWt for the consumption of young workers and c
Y E
t
for the consumption of young entrepreneurs) equals their (actual) wage earnings minus their
savings:
cYWt + c
Y E
t = ŵt − ηs
W
t − (1− η) s
E
t
Aggregate consumption of the old entrepreneurs cOEt is given by
cOEt = (1− η)max
[
qtft − rt
(
kt − s
E
t−1
)
− wtlt, 0
]
By substituting 1−η
η
bt − rts
W
t−1 for d
W
t in c
OW
t and summing up the above variables we
can write the aggregate consumption Ct = c
OW
t + c
YW
t + c
Y E
t + c
OE
t plus aggregate savings
St = ηs
W
t + (1− η) s
E
t in the economy in period t as
Ct + St = (1− η) bt + ŵt + (1− η)max
[
qtft − rt
(
kt − s
E
t−1
)
− wtlt, 0
]
Recall that ŵt = min
[
wt,
qtft
lt
]
and bt = min
[
rt
(
kt − s
E
t−1
)
, qtft − et
]
, where et =
min [wtlt, qtft] = ŵtlt. Substituting these into the above formula yields:
Ct + St = (1− η)min
[
rt
(
kt − s
E
t−1
)
, qtft − ŵtlt
]
+ ŵt +
+(1− η)max
[
qtft − rt
(
kt − s
E
t−1
)
− wtlt, 0
]
We only need to recall that since the whole young generation supplies exactly one unit
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of labor, the amount of productive labor per entrepreneur is lt =
1
1−η
, which results in
Ct + St = min
[
(1− η) rt
(
kt − s
E
t−1
)
, (1− η) qtft − ŵt
]
+ ŵt +
+max
[
(1− η)
(
qtft − rt
(
kt − s
E
t−1
))
− wt, 0
]
If the shock is small we obtain
Ct + St = (1− η) rt
(
kt − s
E
t−1
)
+ wt + (1− η)
(
qtft − rt
(
kt − s
E
t−1
))
− wt =
= (1− η) qtft = Yt
If the shock is moderate, the equation turns into
Ct + St = (1− η) qtft − wt + wt = Yt
Finally, if the shock is severe,only young generation is (partially) paid in amount ŵt =
qtft
lt
= (1− η) qtft, therefore
Ct + St = ŵt = (1− η) qtft = Yt
Appendix C. Proofs
PROOF of Proposition 3.1
Proof.
Existence
Preferences and production technology satisfy the assumptions of the competitive equi-
librium existence theorem (Arrow and Debreu, 1954):19
1. the set of available consumption vectors (ct, ct+1) for each generation t is closed, convex
and bounded from below
2. the preferences of consumers of each generation t are represented by continuous, mono-
tonically increasing, quasi-concave utility functions of (ct, ct+1)
3. the initial endowment of the individuals is strictly positive at least in one component (in
the model, each individual in each generation is endowed with one unit of labor, which is
converted into ŵt > 0 units of initial endowment in goods)
4. production technologies belong to a part of each generation and are given by a continuous
strictly increasing and concave production functions with no output at zero input.
19 Arrow and Debreu (1954) consider multiproduct technologies with an assumption that in the absence of factor
restrictions, the production of any good may be increased without a decrease in the production of
other goods. The model in the current paper is based upon a one-product technology.
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Uniqueness
Consider first labor market (LM). The LM-equilibrium condition is
l (rt+1, wt+1) =
1
1− η
(C-1)
Function l (rt+1, wt+1) decreases in both interest rate and wage level (
∂l
∂rt+1
< 0, ∂l
∂wt+1
<
0). The implicit function theorem guarantees that equation (C-1) defines a unique function
rt+1 (wt+1) with
∂rt+1
∂wt+1
< 0. This means that for any given interest rate established in the
credit market, there will always exist only one equilibrium wage level in the labor market.
Consider now the equilibrium in the credit market (CM):
(1− η)
(
kt+1 − s
E
t
)
= ηsWt (C-2)
Optimal choice of the entrepreneurs implies ∂k
∂rt+1
< 0, ∂k
∂wt+1
< 0, ∂s
E
t
∂wt+1
< 0 and ∂s
E
t
∂rt+1
>
0. Optimal choice of the workers implies ∂s
W
t
∂wt+1
< 0 and ∂s
W
t
∂rt+1
> 0. The sum and the difference
of differentiable functions are differentiable. Hence, equation (C-2) also implicitly yields a
differentiable function rt+1 (wt+1) which is unique.
Combining rCMt+1 (wt+1), defined in the credit market, with r
LM
t+1 (wt+1), defined in the
labor market, we obtain an equilibrium interest rate and wage level, which exist. Assume
that there are several equilibria and choose the one with the smallest wt+1 = w. Consider
now the difference rCMt+1 (wt+1) − r
LM
t+1 (wt+1), which is zero in the equilibrium chosen. This
difference increases as wt+1 increases (see Lemma 6.1 below):
∂rCMt+1
∂wt+1
−
∂rLMt+1
∂wt+1
> 0 (C-3)
Hence, the difference rCMt+1 (wt+1)−r
LM
t+1 (wt+1) is positive for any wt+1 > w. This means
there are no equilibria with wt+1 > w. Because of the choice of w, there are also no equilibria
with wt+1 < w, This proves the uniqueness of the equilibrium point (w
∗
t+1 = w, r
∗
t+1 =
rLMt+1 (w) = r
CM
t+1 (w))
Lemma 6.1 Equilibrium gap rCMt+1 (wt+1)− r
LM
t+1 (wt+1) increases in wt+1
Proof. The slope of the equilibrium line in the credit market can be found through implicit
differentiation:
∂rt+1
∂wt+1
= −
η
∂sWt
∂wt+1
− (1− η)
(
∂k
∂wt+1
− ∂s
E
t
∂wt+1
)
η
∂sWt
∂rt+1
− (1− η)
(
∂k
∂rt+1
−
∂sEt
∂rt+1
) (C-4)
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The denominator in this fraction is always positive. Since (C-4) is valid for any value
of parameter η ∈ [0, 1], we can check, whether it is positive or negative for its upper and
lower limits: {
∂rt+1
∂wt+1
}CM
η=0
= −
∂k
∂wt+1
− ∂s
E
t
∂wt+1
∂k
∂rt+1
−
∂sEt
∂rt+1
< 0 (C-5)
{
∂rt+1
∂wt+1
}CM
η=1
= −
∂sWt
∂wt+1
∂sWt
∂rt+1
> 0 (C-6)
This means that for all possible functions k, sE and sW , setting η = 0 (and close to
it) guarantees that CM-line is monotonically decreasing in wt+1; and setting η = 1 (and
close to it) guarantees that CM-line is monotonically increasing in wt+1 for any given wage
parameter wt.
Furthermore, for each set of functions k, sE and sW , the slope of the CM-line mono-
tonically increases in η as η changes from 0 to 1:
∂
∂η
{
∂rt+1
∂wt+1
}CM
= −
∂sWt
∂rt+1
(
∂k
∂wt+1
− ∂s
E
t
∂wt+1
)
− ∂s
W
t
∂wt+1
(
∂sEt
∂rt+1
− ∂k
∂rt+1
)
[
η
∂sWt
∂rt+1
− (1− η)
(
∂k
∂rt+1
−
∂sEt
∂rt+1
)]2 > 0 (C-7)
This ensures that at any point wt+1 the derivative
∂rt+1
∂wt+1
is always bounded by (C-5)
from below and by (C-6) from above. Since
{
∂rt+1
∂wt+1
}LM
<
{
∂rt+1
∂wt+1
}CM
η=0
(for proof see Lemma
6.2 below), the slope of the LM-line is smaller than the smallest possible slope of the CM-line
in any point wt+1, so that the gap r
CM
t+1 − r
LM
t+1 increases in wt+1.
20
Lemma 6.2 The slopes of the LM- and CM-lines are related with{
∂rt+1
∂wt+1
}LM
<
{
∂rt+1
∂wt+1
}CM
η=0
(C-8)
Proof. The slope of the LM-line is given by{
∂rt+1
∂wt+1
}LM
= −
∂l
∂wt+1
∂l
∂rt+1
(C-9)
The slope of the CM-line is given by{
∂rt+1
∂wt+1
}CM
= −
η
∂sWt
∂wt+1
− (1− η)
(
∂k
∂wt+1
− ∂s
E
t
∂wt+1
)
η
∂sWt
∂rt+1
− (1− η)
(
∂k
∂rt+1
−
∂sEt
∂rt+1
) (C-10)
20 It suffices to consider the derivative of this gap.
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Choose η = 0. We need to prove that
−
lw
lr
< −
kw − s
E
w
kr − sEr
(C-11)
where kw, lw, s
E
w, kr, lr, and s
E
r denote derivatives of the respective functions.
This last condition is fulfilled as soon as
lwkr − lws
E
r > kwlr − s
E
w lr (C-12)
Consider the properties of factor demands21:
lw =
fkk
fkkfll − (fkl)
2 < 0 (C-13)
kw = lr =
−fkl
fkkfll − (fkl)
2 < 0 (C-14)
kr =
fll
fkkfll − (fkl)
2 < 0 (C-15)
Hence
kwlr − lwkr =
(flk)
2 − fkkfll[
fkkfll − (fkl)
2]2 < 0 (C-16)
Combining this with sEw < 0 and s
E
r > 0, we obtain
−lws
E
r > kwlr − lwkr − s
E
w lr (C-17)
The latter inequality is true, since the left-hand side is positive and the right-hand side
is negative. This proves C-12 and consequently the statement of the Lemma.
PROOF of Proposition 5.1
Proof.
The dynamics of deficits is given by
dt+1 = (1− η) r
C
t+1
(
kt+1 − s
E
t
)
− ηrDt+1s
W
t (C-18)
Substitute for rDt+1 = r
C
t+1 − δ
reg
t+1 (dt):
dt+1 = r
C
t+1
[
(1− η)
(
kt+1 − s
E
t
)
− ηsWt
]
+ δregt+1 (dt) ηs
W
t (C-19)
Since (1− η)
(
kt+1 − s
E
t
)
− ηsWt = dt, the latter implies dt+1 > dt if and only if
δ
reg
t+1 (dt) >
(
rCt+1 − 1
)
(−dt)
ηsWt
= δcritt+1 (dt) > 0 (C-20)
21 The denominator fkkfll − (fkl)
2 is positive due to the concavity assumption.
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